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Detecting botnets in a network is crucial because bot-activities impact numerous
areas such as security, finance, health care, and law enforcement. Most existing rule and
flow-based detection methods may not be capable of detecting bot-activities in an
efficient manner. Hence, designing a robust botnet-detection method is of high
significance. In this study, we propose a botnet-detection methodology based on graphbased features. Self-Organizing Map is applied to establish the clusters of nodes in the
network based on these features. Our method is capable of isolating bots in small clusters
while containing most normal nodes in the big-clusters. A filtering procedure is also
developed to further enhance the algorithm efficiency by removing inactive nodes from
bot detection. The methodology is verified using real-world CTU-13 and ISCX botnet
datasets and benchmarked against classification-based detection methods. The results
show that our proposed method can efficiently detect the bots despite their varying
behaviors.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Introduction
During the last 15 years, botnets have caused some of the most devastating and

costly internet security incidents in the world [1]. The term "bot" comes from robot
which is also sometimes called Zombie. A bot may also be known as a Web robot or
WWW robot. It is a type of malware [2] that an attacker can exploit to control an infected
computer. It is installed into a compromised computer which can be controlled remotely
by an attacker or a group of attackers for fulfilling their own gain. One of the most
common methods for a bot program to infect a compromised computer is by a malicious
website the user is visiting that silently searches and exploits vulnerability in the user's
system in order to install the bot on it. Some other ways to infect include sending the bot
as an attached file with spam emails, or as a program dropped from the payload of
another malware. After successful installation of bot code into the compromised
computer, it becomes part of large network of compromised computers and hence the
term “botnet” is used. Attacker can issue commands to a single bot, or to all the bots in
botnet. The attacker controlling the botnet is sometimes referred to as the
“botherder””botmaster” or “controller” [3]. Figure 1 shows a typical botnet cycle.
Contrary to existing malware such as viruses and worms, which focus on attacking the
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infecting host, bots can receive commands from botmaster and can also be used in a
distributed attack platform [4].

Figure 1.1

Botnet life cycle

Botnets can significantly damage the security of individuals and businesses. They
pose a serious and growing threat against cyber-security as they provide a distributed
platform for many cyber-crimes such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
against critical targets, malware dissemination, phishing, and click fraud [5, 6]. Even in
some cases, botmasters sell access to the botnet to other criminals – either on a rental
basis or as an outright sale [7]. As a result, botnet detection has been a major research
topic in recent years. Researchers have proposed several detection approaches for botnet
detection to combat botnet threat against cyber-security [8]. A majority of the existing
Botnet detection approaches concentrate primarily on particular Botnet command and
control (C&C) protocols (e.g., HTTP, IRC) and structures (e.g., centralized or P2P). They
follow rule based approaches to detect botnets in network. However, these approaches
2

can become ineffective and obsolete if botnets change their structure and C&C
techniques to evade detection [4]. Thus, a robust botnet detection approach that can
detect any type of botnet with varying characteristics is of utmost importance. Before
exploring existing botnet detection schemes in literature, we first survey some of the
studies done in anomaly detection. Later, existing efforts dedicated to bot detection are
identified that can be divided into two broad categories: botnet detection using NetFlow
based features and graph-based features.
1.2

Anomaly detection techniques
Researchers have conducted extensive research on anomaly detection techniques

over the years. For example: Fadlullah et al. [9] develop a novel detection technique
called DTRAB to infer DDoS attacks. The authors investigated the detection of attacks
against application-level protocols that are encapsulated via encryption. In essence, this
detection scheme is a distributed detection mechanism capable of detecting the
anomalous events as early as possible. Moreover, DTRAB is able to simultaneously
construct a defensive mechanism to discover attacks as well as find out the root of the
threat by tracing back the attacker’s original network. The effectiveness of this scheme is
validated via simulation. Flow correlation information is utilized by Zhang et al. [10, 11,
12] to further improve the classification accuracy considering only a small number of
training instances based on K-NN and Naive Bayes classifier that are used to detect
anomalies in the network. Yan et al. [13] propose a framework of security and trust for
5G based on the perspective that the next generation network functions will be highly
virtualized and software defined networking is applied for traffic control. The proposed
approach by the researchers utilizes adaptive trust evaluation and management
3

technologies as well as sustainable trusted computing technologies to achieve computing
platform trust and software defined networking security. A qualitative comparison
between the advantages and disadvantages of software defined networking and traditional
networking regarding security issues concerning overall architecture and a detailed
analysis of the threats of software defined networking from the perspective of functional
layers and attack types is provided by Shu et al. [14].
1.3

Flow-Based Methods
The botnet detection literature using NetFlow based features is a rich one and

many researchers have significantly contributed in this area (e.g. [15-17]). Most of the
existing detection schemes falls into either of the two types of methods: clustering and
classification ([24, 27, 29]), and others.
Clustering is a popular approach taken by researchers to detect botnets using flow
based features. Zeidanloo et al. have proposed a botnet detection framework that can
detect botnets without prior knowledge of them [19]. This detection framework is based
on finding similar communication patterns and behaviors among the group of hosts that
are performing at least one malicious activity using X-means clustering. Using Audit
Record Generation and Utilization System (ARGUS) [20], the authors have collected
flow based information such as source IP address, destination IP address, source Port,
destination Port, duration, protocol, number of packets, and number of bytes transferred
in both directions, which are later used to detect the group of hosts that exhibit similar
behavior and communication pattern. Karasaridis et al. have developed a K-mean based
method that employs scalable non-intrusive algorithms that analyze vast amounts of
summary traffic data [22]. Gu et al. have proposed a novel anomaly-based botnet
4

detection system that is independent of the protocol and structure used by botnets [26].
This detection system has exploited the essential definition and properties of botnets, i.e.,
bots within the same botnet exhibit similar C&C communication patterns and similar
malicious activities patterns. It utilizes a number of flow based information such as time,
source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port, duration, and the number of
packets and bytes transferred in both directions. C-plane clustering method is used to read
the communication logs generated by C plane monitor and find clusters that share similar
communication pattern. Arshad et al. have developed an anomaly-based method that
require not a priori knowledge of bot signatures, botnet C&C protocols, and the C&C
server addresses [28]. Flow characteristics such as IP, port, packet event times, and bytes
per packet are examined by Amini et al. to detect botnets where these NetFlow data is
collected, filtered, and is finally clustered using hierarchical clustering [25]. Rule based
methods are then applied to refine the clusters to reduce the percentage of false positives.
Among the authors’ who use classification techniques, Strayer et al. have
developed detection approaches by examining flow characteristics such as bandwidth,
packet timing, and burst duration, where they first eliminate traffic that is unlikely to be a
part of a botnet, classify the remaining traffic into a group that is likely to be part of a
botnet by using J48 decision trees, naïve Bayes, and Bayesian classifier, and finally
correlate the likely traffic to find common communications patterns that would suggest
the activity of a botnet [24,29]. Fairly recently, a decision tree classifier has been used by
Zhao et al. to detect botnets by investigating 12 flow based features [27]. Their proposed
method can detect botnets during the C&C and attack phases based on the observation of
network flow characteristics for specific time intervals. It does not require significant
5

malicious activity to occur before detection as it can recognize command and control
signals. Simultaneously, it does not require the group behavior of several bots before it
can be confident about making a decision.
Lu et al. have incorporated both classification and clustering techniques in
detection of botnets, developing an unsupervised botnet detection framework where they
first identify network traffic from existing known applications, then focus on each
application community that might include botnet communication flows [30]. This
network traffic is then clustered to find the anomalous behaviors on that specific
application community based on the n-gram features extracted from the content of
network flows. The proposed detection framework has been evaluated on an IRC
community and results show that this approach obtains a high detection rate with a very
low false alarm rate when detecting IRC botnet traffic.
Apart from classification and clustering techniques, there are a number of other
studies that employ other approaches in botnet detection using NetFlow based features.
Interested readers can refer to [18, 21, 23, 31, and 32] for such related works.
Limitation: Existing methods of botnet Detection based on NetFlow traffic
features rely on computing statistical features of flow traffic or on deep packet inspection.
As a result, these methods only capture the characteristics of bots effects on individual
links, rather than on the topological structure of a neighborhood/subgraph as a whole. In
particular, flow-based detection methods require the comparison of each traffic flow to
all the others in order to determine malicious traffic, instead of monitoring the network
behaviors in a holistic manner. Such techniques are also deficient in that attackers can
evade detection by the use of encrypting commands or changes in data volume or change
6

in some other behavioral characteristics such as by the use of variable length encryption
or changes in packet structure that leads to new behavioral characteristics. To overcome
this deficiency, another stream of research has focused on detecting botnets based on
graph-based features. This approach is fundamentally more efficient than flow based
approaches since it avoids the need to cross compare flows across the dataset [33].
1.4

Graph-Based Methods
There are a number of studies that use different graph-based features to detect

anomalies. Literature in this domain can be broadly categorized into two groups: one
group detects anomalies in static graphs using graph-based features whereas another
group does the same, but with dynamic graphs. The static graphs can be further
categorized into plain graphs and attributed graphs. Among the studies that use plain
graphs for anomaly detection, Ding et al. [34], Henderson et al. [35], Henderson et al.
[36], Kang et al. [37], Aggarwal [38], Zimek et al. [39], Chen and Giles [40] and many
more utilize structure-based patterns to detect anomalies. On the other hand, studies done
by Sun et al. [41], Tong and Lin [42], Ambai et al. [43], Nikulin and Huang [44] focus on
the utilization of community based patterns to detect anomalies. Similarly, for attributed
graphs Davis et al. [45], Eberle and Holder [46], and Kontkanen and Myllymki [47] use
structure based patterns whereas Gao et al. [48], Muller et al. [49], Perozzi et al. [50] use
community based patterns to detect anomalies. With dynamic graphs, authors have used
the notion of graph similarity based on certain properties such degree distribution,
diameter [51-53], by resorting to matrix or tensor decomposition of the time-varying
graphs [54-57], or by monitoring graph communities over time and reporting events
when there is structural or contextual change in any of them [58,59].
7

Botnet detection studies using graph-based features mainly exploits the spatial
relationships in communication traffic [31,60,61]. Collins and Reiter have proposed a
method to identify bots by noting that scanning behavior initiated by bot infected hosts
would tend to connect different disconnected components of protocol-specific traffic
graphs [70]. Wang and Paschalidis [62] use behavioral characteristics of bots to detect
botnets. Primarily, the authors have focused on analyzing the social relationships that are
modeled as graph of nodes. The authors have considered both social interaction graphs
and social correlation graphs and have applied the proposed method to a real-world case
study. However, for this detection scheme to be successful bots need to show systematic
pattern in behavior that may not be very robust for stealthy botnet. ‘Graption’ is a graphbased method proposed by Iliofotou et al. that identifies peer-to-peer flows by calculating
the in-degree to out degree ratio of hosts in protocol traffic graphs [63]. However, this
method can be defeated by protocol randomization. A graph-based detection approach to
detect web-account abuse attack has been proposed by Zhao et al. where the correlations
among botnet activities are uncovered by constructing large user-user graphs [64]. This
approach, termed as ‘BotGraph’ has two components: aggressive sign-up detection and
stealthy bot user connection. The first component ensures that the total number of
possible bots are limited whereas second component detects stealthy bot users based on
constructing a user-user random undirected graph. Only the edge weight feature has been
used to detect bots in the graph. Although, the detection rate is very high, this method’s
accuracy can be disputed if other types of botnets besides the spamming one need to be
detected. Jaikumar and Kak have presented a graph-based framework for isolating
botnets in a network [65]. This framework uses temporal co-occurrences in the activity
8

space to detect botnets. This makes the framework independent of the software
architecture of the malware infecting the hosts. The proposed framework has been
validated by applying it to a simulated environment. However, this approach falls short if
bots don’t exhibit temporally co-occurring malicious activities. Nagaraja et al. have
proposed a botnet detection technique based on structured graph analysis that localizes
botnet members by identifying unique communication patterns arising from the overlay
topologies prevalent in command and control structure [66]. However, this approach
must be paired with some other malware detection scheme to clearly distinguish botnets
from regular flows. Francois et al. have proposed an approach called ‘BotTrack’ where
NetFlow related data is correlated and a host dependency model is leveraged for
advanced data mining purposes [67]. They have used the popular linkage analysis
algorithm ‘PageRank’ with an additional clustering process to efficiently detect botnets.
However, to validate the proposed method, the researchers have only used 13.7 GB of
real world data; also, they have generated the botnet randomly as the dataset was not
labeled. Moreover, the authors’ have assumed that a certain percentage of bots and their
characteristic were known beforehand. So, if an unknown botnet exists in the network,
their approach may not give good results. Francois et al. have further extended their work
on ‘BotTrack’ by developing a scalable method called ‘BotCloud’ for detecting botnets
regarding the relationships between hosts [68]. The evaluation of this method has showed
a good detection accuracy and a good efficiency based on a Hadoop cluster. But, in this
case also, the authors have initially used a botnet free dataset and later randomly have
generated botnets in them. Hang et al. have used community detection based clustering to
identify long-lived low intensity flows using graph-based features [69].
9

Limitation: Similar to botnet detection methods using statistical features of
flow/packet traffic or in some cases even deep packet inspection, existing graph-based
botnet detection methods available in the literature have some major limitations. Many of
them apply the botnet detection scheme that operates in a simulated environment (e.g.
[65]). Moreover, the detection approach proposed in the literature is mostly rule based,
meaning that a predetermined rule needs to be established beforehand to detect botnets
from a graph (e.g., [60]). This approach may lead to unwarranted result if bots behave
differently from a common norm. Although many of the graph-based detection schemes
use filtering to remove bot free data (e.g., [64, 66]) and then apply a detection method,
the amount of data that needs to be investigated to detect botnets is relatively large.
Simultaneously, if dataset is large, the computational expense is often high for the
detection approach; which is a huge disadvantage if faster detection is required [64].
1.5

Significance of Our Approach
An important step towards developing a new graph-based detection approach

would be to develop a method that is fast and does not follow any particular rule to detect
botnets. Simultaneously, the approach must be validated on a real world dataset with
different types of botnets. This detection scheme should also be robust enough so that it
can be able to reduce the amount of data that is further investigated to detect any kind of
botnet present in the dataset. In this study, we have proposed an approach based on
graph-based features that can fulfil these requirements. Our main contribution can be
summarized as:
•

We present a novel graph-based method for the detection of botnets in a

computer network.
10

•

Our approach does not depend on any rules to detect botnets and is

capable of capturing the changing behavior of bots.
•

Seven graph-based features are used in this study to detect botnets.

•

The proposed method can detect different types of botnets with different

types of behavioral characteristics.
•

A real world dataset is used to validate the results.

However, handling real world big data consisting of botnets is challenging.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief
description of the real world dataset used in this study. Chapter 3 discusses in detail the
seven features used to detect botnets and the clustering methodology implemented to
cluster these features. Chapter 4 provides numerical results obtained after applying
clustering methodology to the real world dataset as well as giving a comparative
overview of applying classification techniques. Chapter 5 concludes our work and
reviews our main contribution to the existing literature.

11

CHAPTER II
DATA DESCRIPTION
2.1

Data Description
Big data has been an area of interest among researchers in recent years. For

instance: Tsai et al. [71] have provided a comprehensive review on studies that attempt to
develop new schemes capable of handling big data during the input, analysis, and output
stages of knowledge discovery. They have found that majority of the existing literature is
focused on innovative methods for data mining and analysis. However, little to no
attention have been given to the pre- and post-analysis processing methods. Evolution
based algorithms such as accelerated particle swam optimization is used to reduce the
dimensionality of big data by Fong et al. [72]. Authors have investigated the applicability
their method on exceptionally large volume of data with high degree dimensions and
have found that the proposed method results in enhanced analytical accuracy within
reasonable processing time. In this study, big data consisting botnet is used for validating
the proposed detection methodology. In this study we use the CTU-13 dataset which is
one of the biggest labelled datasets available that consists of botnet traffic as well as
normal and background labeled data. It was captured at Czech Technological University
in 2011. The developers of the dataset have originally developed it to compare three
detection methods, namely Cooperative Adaptive Mechanism for Network Protection
(CAMNEP) method, BCIus detetection method, and BotHunter method [73]. Researchers
12

have found that BCIus and CAMNEP detection methods cannot be generalized for all
types of botnet behavior. Each of them seems fit for different types of behavior. Analysis
of BotHunter detection method shows that in real environments it can still be useful to
have blacklists of known malicious IP addresses known beforehand.
After the development of CTU-13 dataset, it has been used by Grill et al. [74] to
evaluate the effects of Local Adaptive Multivariate Smoothing (LAMS) model on the
NetFlow anomaly detection engine. The proposed method is able to reduce false alarm
rate of anomaly detection based intrusion detection systems. Fairly recently,
Chanthakoummane et al. [75] have utilized five scenarios of the CTU-13 dataset to
evaluate the Snort-IDS rules detection botnets and analyze the function of the botnets in
three rules packet such as botnet-cnc.rules, blacklist.rules, and spyware-put.rules.
Experimental results show that botnet-cnc.rules can detect botnets for 29798 alerts.
Blacklist.rules can detect botnets for up to 44 alerts. Spyware-put.rules cannot detect any
botnet. The researchers eventually surmise that botnet-cnc.rules are most proficient in
detecting botnets.
Although, researchers are excited about the potential of using CTU-13 datasets in
detecting botnets, (e.g., see Malowidzki et al. [76], Chanthakoumman et al. [75])
according to best of this author’s knowledge, no significant work has been done using
CTU-13 data in the detection of botnets. CTU 13 dataset consists of 13 captures (called
scenarios) of different botnet samples [61]. This dataset was designed with goals such as
•

Dataset must have real botnet attacks, not simulated attacks

•

Must have real world traffic

13

•

Must have ground truth labels for training and evaluating methods
discussed in [73]

•

Must include multiple types of botnets.

•

Must have several bots infected simultaneously to capture synchronization
patterns.

•

Must have NetFlow files to protect the privacy of the users.

A scenario in CTU-13 can be defined as a particular infection of the virtual
machines using a specific malware. Data collection period for each scenario is
significantly different from one another. The duration of recorded NetFlow data vary
from 0.26 hours to 66.85 hours and subsequently the amount of NetFlow data also varies
accordingly. Multiple types of bots are found in the scenarios. Majority of the scenarios
have only one bots (scenario 1-8 and 13), whereas few (scenario 9-12) have multiple bots
in them. Percentage of botnet flow is also very negligible (<2%) compared to total
NetFlow for majority of the scenarios. However, botnet flow percentage increases (6-8%)
when there are multiple bots present in the dataset (except scenario 12). Another
distinctive feature of CTU-13 dataset is that, each scenario has been manually analyzed
and labeled. The labeling process was performed inside the NetFlow files. Table 2.1
provides a summary of the amount of data on each botnet scenario and percentage of
botnet on each scenario.
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Table 2.1
Dataset
1
2
3
4

Characteristics of Botnet Scenarios [37]
IRC Spam
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

CF

PS

P2P

US

HTTP
✓
✓

✓
✓

6

✓

7
8

✓

9
10
11
12
13

FF

✓

✓

5

DDoS

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

✓

✓

UDP and ICMP
DDoS
Scan web
proxies
Proprietary
C&C.RDP
Chinese hosts
Proprietary
C&C.Net
BIOS,STUN

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓

Note

✓
✓

✓

✓

IRC: Internet relay chat
CF: Click fraud
PS: Port scanned
DDOS: Distributed Denial of service
ICMP: Internet Control Message
Protocol
STUN: Simple traversal of UDP through
NATs

UDP DDoS
ICMP DDoS
Synchronization
Captcha, Web
mail

FF; Fast flux
P2P: Peer to peer
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer
Protocol
UDP: User Datagram Protocol
NetBIOS: Network basic
input/output System

Another distinctive feature of CTU-13 dataset is that, each scenario has been
manually analyzed and labeled. The labeling process was performed inside the NetFlow
files. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the amount of data on each botnet scenario and
percentage of botnet on each scenario.
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Table 2.2
Dataset
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

2.2

Amount of Data on each Botnet Scenario of CTU-13 dataset.
Duration
(hrs)
6.15
4.21
66.85
4.21
11.63
2.18
0.38
19.5
5.18
4.75
0.26
1.21
16.36

NetFlows

Size(GB)

2824637
1808123
4710639
1121077
129833
558920
114078
2954231
2753885
1309792
107252
325472
1925150

52
60
121
53
37.6
30
5.8
123
94
73
5.2
8.3
34

Bot
name
Neris
Neris
Rbot
Rbot
Virut
Menti
Sogou
Murlo
Neris
Rbot
Rbot
NSIS.ay
Virut

Number
of Bots
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
10
10
3
3
1

Botnet flow
39933(1.41%)
18839(1.04%)
26759(0.56%)
1719(0.15%)
695(0.53%)
4431(0.79%)
37(0.03%)
5052(0.17%)
179880(6.5%)
106315(8.11%)
8161(7.6%)
2143(0.65%)
38791(2.01%)

ISCX Botnet Dataset
ISCX botnet dataset was developed by Information Security Center of Excellence

(ISCX) at the University of New Brunswick (UNB). Researchers at UNB have developed
this dataset with the purpose to determine the performance of any intrusion detection
approaches or making comparisons which requires experimentation with data that
includes real time traffic [92]. ISCX botnet dataset is an evaluation dataset combining
non overlapping subsets of three different available datasets: ISOT dataset [21], ISCX
2012 IDS dataset [93], and CTU-13 dataset [37]. In order to produce this synthetic
dataset, the researchers have employed an overlay methodology [94] to combine all the
three different datasets into one unified dataset which has wide range of bots. Final ISCX
botnet dataset was divided into two training and test datasets, where we have selected as a
test dataset to implement our methodology. Table 2.3 and 2.4 provide a clear insight to
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different Botnet types and portion of flows in the ISCX botnet testing dataset. Access to
this dataset is available upon request from the researchers of ISCX UNB.
Table 2.3

Distribution of botnet types in the ISCX botnet test dataset

Botnet name

Type

Flow portions in dataset

Neris

IRC

25967(5.67%)

Rbot

IRC

83(0.018%)

Menti

IRC

2878(0.62%)

Sogou

HTTP

89(0.019%)

Murlo

IRC

4881(1.06%)

Virut

HTTP

58576(12.80%)

NSIS

P2P

757(0.165%)

Zeus

P2P

502(0.109%)

SMTP Spam

P2P

21633(4.2%)

UDP Storm

P2P

44062(9.63%)

Tbot

IRC

1296(0.283%)

Zero Access

P2P

1011(0.221%)

Weasel

P2P

42313(9.25%)

Smoke Bot

P2P

78(0.017%)

Zeus Control (C&C)

P2P

31(0.006%)

ISCX IRC bot

P2P

1816(0.387%)
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Table 2.4

List of all malicious in the ISCX botnet test dataset

192.168.2.112
198.164.30.2
192.168.2.113
192.168.2.112
147.32.84.180
147.32.84.140
10.0.2.15
172.16.253.130
172.16.253.240

131.202.243.84
192.168.2.110
192.168.1.103
192.168.2.109
147.32.84.170
147.32.84.130
192.168.106.141
172.16.253.131
74.78.117.238

192.168.3.35
172.29.0.116
192.168.248.165

192.168.3.25
172.29.0.109
10.37.130.4

192.168.5.122
192.168.4.118
192.168.4.120
192.168.2.105
147.32.84.150
147.32.84.160
192.168.106.131
172.16.253.129
158.65.110.24
192.168.3.65
172.16.253.132

The proposed approach in this study is first of its kind to convert the NetFlow
features available from CTU-13 and ISCX dataset into graph-based features and use these
graph features to detect botnets. As CTU-13 dataset is the most complete real world
dataset [41], we choose this dataset primarily to prove the concept of our novel approach
and as an extension we also use ISCX Botnet test dataset to compare the efficiency of
proposed bot detection approach, the details of which are discussed in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This section discusses in detail the seven features used to detect botnets and the
clustering methodology implemented to cluster these features. First of all, a directed
graph is generated for each of 13 datasets of CTU-13. A directed graph (digraph) can be
defined as a set of nodes connected by directed edges where each edge points from first
node of a graph pair to the second node of the pair. Mathematically, a directed graph can
be expressed as an ordered pair where V is a set of nodes and E is an ordered pair of
edges. Note that, in this study each node denotes a unique IP address and each edge
denotes the connection between one IP address to another. Subsequently, the feature
values are calculated of these directed graphs and afterwards clustering methodology is
applied to find out the nodes with similar features.
3.1

Graph-Based Features Selection
We have initially tried different combinations of 11 extracted graph features to

check the percentage of nodes to be eliminated when SOM technique is implemented on
13 CTU datasets (see Table 3.1). Among them, finally 7 features are selected. These 7
features include the indegree, outdegree, sum of ingoing edges weight, sum of outgoing
edges weight, clustering coefficient, node betweenness centrality, and eigen vector
centrality. A set of 9 features include indegree duration and outdegree duration along
with the 7 features. Finally, 11 features include ingoing protocol mode and outgoing
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protocol mode in addition to the 9 features. Results from the Table 3.1 clearly indicate
that percentage of nodes to be eliminated (number of nodes in the largest cluster) in
further investigation of remaining nodes for bot detection in each dataset is very high
(almost greater than 98%) when 7 features are used.
Table 3.1

Combination of different graph-based features vs % of nodes to eliminated

CTU
Dataset

No. of
Nodes

1

% of nodes to be eliminated for bot detection
7 Features

9 Features

11 Features

311420

99.4608

59.8099

7.721405176

2

442471

99.5556

67.1314

8.295006904

3

434988

99.7388

91.6264

17.78968615

4

186245

99.3540

75.8372

8.27887997

5

41658

98.1180

83.7774

9.902059628

6

107343

98.4433

67.7836

11.46604809

7

38205

97.5265

80.356

10.04580552

8

383788

99.7086

78.2263

13.34252243

9

367264

99.7296

76.4496

11.14702231

10

197824

99.5814

13.3265

11.59515529

11

41933

96.8282

87.7877

9.155080724

12

94436

98.5895

77.9152

9.551442247

13

315769

99.2263

76.7827

9.36939978

These observations clearly prove that the computational costs and the time that is
required to search for the malicious activity will be much lower if the right combination
of features are selected. The percentage of nodes for further investigation in identification
20

of bots is very high for 9 and 11 feature combinations compared to 7 feature
combinations. Hence, it can be stated that it is vital to be efficient while extracting graphbased features and implementing bot detection methodology on large datasets. Improper
selection of features may result in increased computational cost. This is the main
rationale behind to proceed with the 7 features combination to implement further
investigations of our study. A brief discussion of these seven features is provided below:
3.1.2

In Degree:
If many suspected bots contact a malicious domain for C&C reasons, this will

result in a relatively high in degree for this domain. Keeping this in mind, in degree has
been chosen as a feature to detect botnet in a network. For a particular node in a directed
graph, in degree can be defined as the total number of head ends adjacent to that node.
High value of in degree for a node indicates the neighboring nodes tendency to establish
more connection where as low value indicates the opposite. For example: Fig. 3.1 shows
that node ‘a’ has an indegree of two.
3.1.3

Out Degree:
For a particular node in a directed graph, the total number of tail ends adjacent to

a node is called the out degree of the node. A high value of out degree for a node implies
that this node tends to make more connections with other nodes and low value implies the
opposite. Bots tend to make more connection with other potential victim computers to
spread the reach of botnet or to C&C domain for transferring information. So, out degree
can be a useful indicator of botnet activity in a graph. As evident from Fig. 3.1, we can
see that, node ‘a’ has an outdegree of two.
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3.1.4

In Degree Weight:
In degree weight refers to the total number of data packets received by a particular

node transferred from its neighboring connected nodes. The mechanics of transferring
data packets consists of setting up the data connection to the appropriate ports and
choosing the parameters for transfer. Besides the raw data every data packet contains, it
also has headers that carry certain types of metadata, along with the routing information
and trailers that help in refining data transmission [77]. Botnets tend to communicate with
each other or to the C&C server to transfer information or update their commands. The
same type of botnets usually communicate periodically and with a predefined set of
commands. We assume that bots will receive the same type of command and receive
approximately same volume of information that can be used to differentiate between bots
and non-bots.
3.1.5

Out Degree Weight:
Out degree weight is the opposite of in degree weight which can be described as

the total number of data packets sent by a particular node to its neighboring connected
nodes. Same as in degree weight, we assume that bots will have similarity in the volume
of data it sends out to other IP addresses in the network and can be a useful indicator of
botnet activity in a network.
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Figure 3.1

3.1.6

A directed graph with three nodes

Node Betweenness Centrality:
In graph theory, node betweenness centrality quantifies the number of times a node

acts as a bridge along the shortest path between two other nodes. More specifically, node
betweenness centrality indicates a particular node's centrality in graph, which refers to how
many shortest paths from all nodes to all others pass through that particular node [78].
Node betweenness centrality can be mathematically expressed as [79]:
𝑁𝐵 (𝑣) = ∑𝑢≠𝑣≠𝑤

𝜎𝑢𝑤 (𝑣)
𝜎𝑢𝑤

(3.1)

Where 𝜎𝑢𝑤 is the total number of shortest paths from node ‘u’ to ‘w’ and 𝜎𝑒𝑏 (𝑣) is
total number of shortest paths that pass-through node ‘v’. Figure 3.2 illustrates the concept
of node betweenness centrality [80] by calculating for node a.
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Figure 3.2

Node betweenness centrality

When calculating betweenness centrality for node a, total number of paths can be
formed between these nodes i.e., (e,d), (e,b), (e,c).
𝑛𝐵 (𝑎) =

𝜎𝑒𝑑 (𝑎)
𝜎𝑒𝑑

+

𝜎𝑒𝑏 (𝑎)
𝜎𝑒𝑏

+

𝜎𝑒𝑐 (𝑎)
𝜎𝑒𝑐

= 1+1+1=3

(3.2)

Node betweenness centrality can be a useful feature to detect botnets especially in
detecting P2P botnets where bots are more interconnected without a central C2C structure.
So, we assume that for a P2P bot in a botnet should have a higher node betweenness
centrality in a graph.
3.1.7

Local Clustering Coefficient
Local clustering coefficient of a node indicates how concentrated the

neighborhood of that node is. More specifically, local clustering coefficient is a metric to
evaluate how close a node’s neighbors are to each other. If K_a denotes the number of
neighbors of node ‘a’ and e_a denotes the number of connected pairs between all
neighbors of node ‘a’, then local clustering coefficient for node ‘a’ can be given by [81]:
𝐶𝑎 = 𝐾

𝑒𝑎

𝑎 (𝐾𝑎 −1)
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(3.3)

Figure 3.3 shows the clustering coefficient of node ‘a’ which is 0.083. Local
clustering coefficient can also be a very significant indicator of a P2P botnet. As
explained before, bots in P2P botnet have a decentralized structure where bots connect
and communicate with each other to remove the need of a centralized server. As a result,
interconnectedness can be a very significant feature to detect P2P botnets which is
essentially the basis of local clustering coefficient.

Figure 3.3

Clustering coefficient of node ‘a’ in a directed graph
𝟏

Clustering coefficient of node ‘a’ in directed graph, 𝑪𝒂 = (𝟒∗𝟑) = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟖𝟑
Local clustering coefficient can also be a very significant indicator of a P2P
botnet. As explained before, bots in P2P botnet have a decentralized structure where bots
connect and communicate with each other to remove the need of a centralized server. As
a result, interconnectedness can be a very significant feature to detect P2P botnets which
is essentially the basis of local clustering coefficient.
3.1.8

Eigen Vector Centrality
Eigen vector centrality, also known as Eigen centrality is a measurement criterion

of influence of a node in a graph. It is essentially the weight of a node in a graph [82].
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Each node is assigned a relative value based on the concept that connections to highscoring nodes contribute more to the score of the node than equal connections to lowscoring nodes. Let G(V,E) be a graph where V is total number of nodes and E is the total
number of edges. Let, A= (a_(v,w)) be the adjacency matrix where
𝑎𝑣,𝑤 = {

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑣 𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑤
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑣 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑤

(3.4)

Then the centrality score can be given as
1

𝑥𝑣 = 𝜆 ∑𝑤∈𝑀(𝑣) 𝑎𝑣,𝑤 𝑥𝑤

(3.5)

where 𝑀(𝑣) is the set of neighbors of node ‘v’ and 𝜆 is a constant. Now equation (1) can
be rewritten as
𝐴𝑥 = 𝜆𝑥

(3.6)

There exists a positive solution λ with final eigenvector after using power method
based on the Perron–Frobenius theorem [83]. λ is also the largest eigenvalue associated
with the eigenvector of the adjacency matrix [84]. Eigenvector centrality is a natural
extension of degree centrality. In-degree centrality awards one centrality points for every
link a node receives. But not all nodes are equivalent: some are more important than
others based on their edge weight, and, reasonably, connections from important nodes
count more. We expect that a bots eigenvector centrality measure should be significantly
different than non-malicious nodes and hence is used as a feature to detect botnets in this
study.
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3.2

Self Organizing Map
Self Organizing Map (SOM) belongs to an interesting class of unsupervised

system that is based on competitive learning in which the output neurons compete
amongst themselves to be activated. The primary goal of an SOM is to convert an
incoming dataset of arbitrary dimension into a one or two-dimensional discrete map, and
to perform this transformation adaptively in a topologically ordered fashion [85]. In this
study, we have considered on a particular kind of SOM known as Kohonen network that
was developed by Tuevo Kohonen in 1982 [95-96].
The basic structure of SOM is shown in Figure 3.4 is a 3×3 SOM network. For
this small SOM network, there are 63 connections. Notice that the map nodes(𝐶1 − 𝐶9)
are not connected to one another. In this 2-D representation of SOM, each map node has
a unique (i,j) coordinate. Simultaneously, as map nodes are only connected to input
vector (𝐹1 − 𝐹7 ), map nodes are never aware of what other map nodes values are. A map
node’s weight (W) will only be updated if and only if the input vector tells it. Algorithm
1 illustrates the basic methodology behind SOM.

Figure 3.4

Structure of Self Organizing Map
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Table 3.2

Algorithm 1: SOM Algorithm
1.

Each map nodes(𝑪𝟏 − 𝑪𝟗 ) weights (W) are initialized with small random
values.

2.

An input vector (𝑭𝟏 − 𝑭𝟕 ) is chosen from the training dataset and is
presented to the network.

3.

Each node is inspected to determine which node’s weight best matches the
input vector’s weight. The winning node is termed as ‘Winning Neuron’ or
‘Winner Takes All Neuron’ or ‘Best Matching Unit (BMU)’. BMU can be
calculated as

4.

𝟐
𝑩𝑴𝑼 = 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝒊𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕 𝒗𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓 = ∑𝑫
(3.7)
𝒊=𝟏(𝑭𝒊 − 𝑾𝒊 )
The radius of the BMU is calculated which is typically set to be the radius of
the network that diminishes at each time-step. This can be calculated as
−𝒕

𝝈(𝒕) = 𝝈𝟎 𝒆 𝝀

where t is the current iteration, 𝝀 is the time constant and

(3.8)
is the

radius of the map. can be calculated as
𝛌 = 𝐧𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬⁄𝐦𝐚𝐩𝐑𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐮𝐬
Any node found within the radius of BMU is adjusted to make more
like the input vector. This adjustment can be done by
𝑾(𝒕 + 𝟏) = 𝑾(𝒕) + 𝚽(𝒕)𝑳(𝒕)(𝑿(𝒕) − 𝑾(𝒕))
Where,

(3.9)

(3.10)

−𝒕

𝑳(𝒕) = 𝑳𝟎 𝒆 𝝀
𝚽(𝒕) = 𝒆

−𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝑭𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑩𝑴𝑼𝟐
𝟐𝝈𝟐 (𝒕)

(3.11)
(3.12)

W(t+1) is the new educated weight value of a given node and
is a measure that
is used to force the nodes closer to BMU to learn more than others who are further away.
5.
Repeat 2 for desired number of iterations

In this study, an investigated has been conducted for the accuracy of the detection
algorithm with three different SOM models, i.e., 4*4, 5*5, and 6*6. Among these three
SOM models, 5*5 provides the best solution. With 4*4 SOM model, bots were being
identified in a comparatively larger cluster than 5*5 SOM model whereas with 6*6 SOM
model, many clusters were empty. Hence, 5*5 SOM model was used for the
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demonstration of the effectiveness of this proposed detection method. However, the
difference among the results was not significant and using any of them will result in good
accuracy. Each map nodes weights in the network are initially assigned with seven
random values. After that input vectors, each containing these seven features are
presented to the network. Thenceforth, step 3 to 6 is followed to get the desired number
of clusters.
In its essence, algorithm 1 is essentially screening the dataset and assigning the
nodes to different clusters. This algorithm does not distinguish bots from non-bots. Hence
another algorithm is developed to detect bots in the clusters. This bot detection algorithm
is illustrated below:
Table 3.3

Algorithm 2: Bot search algorithm

1.

Arrange the clusters in ascending order of size.

2.

Remove the cluster with the highest number of nodes.

3.

Starting with the smallest cluster, investigate all the nodes in the rest of
the clusters.

4.

Stop the algorithm when bots are detected. The number of nodes needed
to identify the bots is denoted by 𝑁𝑠 , which characterizes the efficiency
of the proposed bot detection algorithm.

It is consequential that algorithm 2 is performed with caution as the efficiency of
SOM method can be significantly hampered if bots are not identified properly in this
step. After initiating step 1, step 2 is performed based on considering our finding that
botnet flows are typically a small proportion of the overall dataset. As the percentage of
botnet flow is very small, we delete the cluster that have the highest number of nodes by
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assuming bots are not large in number and don't possess the usual similarities to share the
same cluster with normal nodes. The criteria for differentiating bots from non-bots must
be clearly defined and implemented for the success of this method. Eventually, this is
also true that we cannot guarantee the largest cluster will not contain a bot if the bot acts
like normal node and is not triggered to be like a bot until step 2 is initiated.
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CHAPTER IV
CASE STUDY-DETECTING BOTS IN CTU-13
We apply SOM to the CTU-13 dataset to investigate the effectiveness and
efficiency of our proposed method. An enhanced filtering algorithm, based on the degree
of bots, is proposed to further improve the botnet detection efficiency. The results are
benchmarked against a Support Vector Machine based classification algorithm to
demonstrate the strength of our proposed procedure.
4.1

Graph Features Extraction
We first extract graph-based features of CTU-13 data sets as discussed in Chapter

3. Recall that the CTU-13 data sets contain more than 20 million NetFlow records. High
performance computing is needed to streamline to the extraction of graph-based features.
The computation tasks of feature extraction are performed using the Shadow system,
super computer available at The High Performance Computing Collaboratory (HPC²) of
Mississippi State University. The Shadow system is equipped with a Cray CS300-LC
cluster with 4800 Intel Ivy Bridge processor cores and 28,800 Intel Xeon Phi cores. With
the aid of high performance computing capacity, we are able to extract the graph-based
features from all CTU-13 data sets within 20 hours. The resultant graph-based features
are numbered and labeled by Feature 1 – Feature 7 for the notational convenience, as
shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1

Graph-Based Features Used for Clustering.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

In
Degree

Out
Degree

Sum of
Ingoing
Edges
Weight

Sum of
Outgoing
Edges
Weight

Clustering
Coefficient

Node
Betweenness

Eigen
Vector

4.1.2

Graph-Based Botnet Detection Using Clustering
We apply the SOM-based botnet detection algorithm (Algorithm 1) to the

extracted seven graph-based features. Fig. 4.1 demonstrates the results of SOM clustering
based on CTU dataset 6. There is a total number of 25 cells, each representing a possible
cluster of graph-based features. We choose the total number of cells to be 25 so that the
SOM algorithm can captures various types of node behaviors while not significantly
increasing computation costs.

Figure 4.1

SOM hits on CTU-13 dataset 6
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Table 4.2

Number of nodes in the biggest cluster (Normal Nodes).

Dataset

No. of Nodes

No. of Nodes in the biggest
cluster

1

311420

309741

% of nodes to be
eliminated for bot
detection
99.4608

2

442471

440505

99.5556

3

434988

433852

99.7388

4

186245

185042

99.3540

5

41658

40874

98.1180

6

107343

105672

98.4433

7

38205

37260

97.5265

8

383788

382670

99.7086

9

367264

366271

99.7296

10

197824

196996

99.5814

11

41933

40603

96.8282

12

94436

93104

98.5895

13

315769

313326

99.2263

From Figure 4.1, the numbers in each cell represent the total number of nodes that
belong to the corresponding cluster. These nodes share similar behaviors in terms of the
identified graph-based features. For example, there exist 105,672 nodes in the biggest
cluster (in blue), which accounts for over 99% of nodes in Dataset 6. Note that malicious
behaviors i.e., the botnet flows are typically a small proportion of the entire dataset and
when compared to normal flows, botnet flows possess high range of feature values
because they are very active in the network. So, we delete the clusters that have the
highest number of nodes that don't possess the usual characteristics that a bot might have.
This helps to narrow down the identification of bots to the remaining few nodes, which
account for less than 1% of the total nodes. Similar observations are made for the other
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CTU datasets that the majority of the nodes belongs to the biggest cluster and can be
eliminated from the consideration of bot detection (see Table 4.2). For most of the CTU
scenarios, the biggest cluster consists of over 99% of nodes. This allows us to eliminate
the majority of the dataset for further bot identification, significantly reducing the cost of
computation.
We apply the proposed bot search algorithm (Algorithm 2) to the clusters
obtained via SOM. Table 4.3 shows the number of nodes to search to identify all bots in
each data set. The sizes of clusters that include the bots are also reported. Bots can be
isolated in small clusters for most data sets. As a result, bots can be identified by
examining limited number of nodes.
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Table 4.3

Number of Nodes to Search for Bot Identification (𝑁𝑠 )
Size of the
bot cluster

𝑁𝑠

% of nodes to search

1

Number of
identified
bots
1

27

120

0.038

2

1

1

12

41

0.009

3

1

1

26

125

0.028

4

1

1

40

238

0.127

5

1

1

6

26

0.062

6

1

1

38

163

0.151

7

1

1

11

44

0.115

8

1

1

184

563

0.146

9

10

3

21

73

0.019

10

10

7
10

40
20

63
90

0.017
0.045

11

3

2

9

24

0.057

1
2
1
1

770
11
19
16

1306
53
60
64

3.114
0.056
0.063
0.020

Dataset

Number
of bots

1

12

3

13

1

It shows that the proposed method can detect botnet size in a cluster which is very
small compared to the size of the total dataset. Hence, after applying SOM on the dataset,
further investigating the nodes of the small clusters gives the bots present in the dataset.
Bots have been mostly found in small sized clusters. More specifically, in more than 80%
of the cases, bots have been found within the smaller clusters containing only 20% of the
remaining nodes. Although, it still may take some computational effort to further
investigate clusters after initial screening, it is considerably less than the computational
time and complexity resulting from the framework where the entire dataset needs to be
examined.
35

From Table 4.4, it is apparent that although SOM methodology provides good
results in alienating bots from the rest of the nodes, there are no unique values of features
across all bot clusters. From Figure 4.2 it is clear that feature values are far apart for
different nodes. The highest and lowest values of features have been made bold to better
clarify the finding. For example: feature 1 values range from 1 to 6842 and feature 2
values range from 3 to 11571 across all bot clusters. So, there is no fixed range for the
feature values of bots across all the scenarios. A notable conclusion that can be made
from this experiment is that rule based detection methods will not work well in detecting
botnets as different bots behave differently in different scenarios. Thus, detecting botnets
become very challenging. This limitation can be by passed by the proposed approach as it
does not rely on any particular rule. With different types of bot behaviors, the proposed
method can still detect bot with reasonable accuracy. What this approach ensures is that,
bots will always be found in small sized clusters. A majority of the data (>97%) is
removed from consideration, and thus the sample space becomes very negligible. This
relatively smaller sample space need be further investigated to detect botnets. Hence, this
proves the robustness of our proposed approach as it can detect botnets with varying
behavior in different datasets.
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Table 4.4

Feature values of bot cluster
Features

Size of
the bot
cluster

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

27

176

2703

2595

48690

0.0113

0.0007

0.00022

2

12

110

4161

3140

134500

0.0109

0.0003

0.00017

3

26

1727

2391

176967

8806

0.0171

0.0019

0.00122

4

40

153

859

1970

43356

0.0847

0.0003

0.00056

5

6

7

483

310

28527

0

0.0004

1.14E-05

6

38

26

428

1443

12128

0.0449

0.0003

4.72E-05

7

11

25

385

231

21990

0.0283

0.0005

0.00033

8

184

34

289

470

17650

0.1344

3.08E-5

3.84E-06

40

150

6534

3214

121087

0.0512

0.0007

0.000990

21

86

5240

2662

219182

0.0006

0.0006

0.00055

20

6842

7462

6581

355098

0.0145

0.0023

0.16417

9

1219

2883

1223

27505

0

0.0006

0.19237

770

1

3

3

100

0.0110

6.22E-5

5.51E-06

11

509

328

57287

6897

0

0.0019

0.00017

19

169

85

31608

2771

0.0217

0.0005

16

161

11571

974

267041

0.0408

0.0003

0.000283
4.69E-05

Dataset

9
10
11
12
13
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Figure 4.2

4.2

Variation of average feature values in Bot clusters

Feature Evaluations and SOM Based Botnet Detection on Filtered Dataset
In this section, SOM has been applied to filtered CTU-13 dataset to determine

whether filtering the raw data provides better result than shown in section 4.1. What
filtering is essentially doing is that it is removing nodes that cannot be a bot. The basic
assumption made here is that 1-degree nodes can’t be a bot as they are not very active in
the network. As a result, total number of nodes where SOM needs to be applied get
significantly reduced. The steps of filtering are provided below:
1. First convert the flow-based data into graph-based data.
2. Each IP is considered as a node and each connection is considered as an
edge.
3. If there are multiple communications between two nodes, we still
represent them with a single edge, and add other data as weight (attributes)
of that edge.
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4. Calculate the feature values of each node.
5. Compute the degree of each node, and then filter out (remove) the 1degree nodes and their corresponding edges from the graph
Subsequently, SOM has been applied to this filtered dataset. Note that, we have
only used ten filtered datasets for experimental purpose. Results obtained from applying
SOM on filtered dataset is shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5
Dataset

Efficiency of bot detection
Number
of bots

1
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11

Total
number
of nodes
117119
20284
81544
1939
8240
2486
20666
91785
2498

12

4743

3

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
10
3

Number of
identified
bots
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
10
2
1
3

Size of the bot
cluster

𝑵𝒔

27
18
33
7
45
8
61
17
8
146
5

115
96
181
65
252
40
307
77
21
384
36

% of
nodes to
search
0.098
0.473
0.002
3.352
3.058
1.609
1.485
0.083
0.840
15.372
0.759

Results in Table 4.5 show that, after filtering, total number of nodes to examine to
apply SOM gets reduced. Moreover, after applying SOM, in majority of the cases the size
of the cluster where bot is found is smaller than before. Figure 4.3 illustrates this
phenomenon. It is clearly evident from the figure that, for the 10th scenario the bot
cluster size is smaller after filtering. Here, the red star is the bot and black dots are the
other non-malicious nodes in the cluster.
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Figure 4.3

Bot cluster size before and after filtering

As a result, the numbers of nodes to search for bot identification (𝑁𝑠 ) are shown
in Table 4.6 Significant reduction in 𝑁𝑠 can be observed. For example, 1306 nodes need
to be searched for identifying the third bot in Dataset 11. After filtering, 384 nodes need
to be searched only, a reduction of over 70% of the total number of nodes. For dataset 12,
the two clusters containing bots are combined into one after filtering, requiring searching
36 nodes only compared to 113 nodes before clustering. However, we also observed the
𝑁𝑠 values slightly increase for datasets 5 and 6, which may result from randomness of the
clustering algorithm.
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Improvement of 𝑁𝑠 using Filtering

Table 4.6

Dataset

1

Botnet detection after filtering
𝑁𝑠
115

% nodes to
search
0.036

3

125

0.028

96

0.022

4

238

0.127

181

0.097

5

26

0.062

65

0.156

6

163

0.151

252

0.234

7

44

0.115

40

0.104

8

563

0.146

307

0.079

10

90

0.045

77

0.038

11

24

0.057

21

0.050

1306

3.114

384

0.915

53

0.056

36

0.038

60

0.063

12

4.3

Botnet detection without
filtering
% nodes to
𝑁𝑠
search
120
0.038

Extension of SOM Implementation on ISCX botnet test dataset
In order to check the efficiency of the proposed methodology to compare with

CTU-13, we have extracted the same 7 graph-based features for the new ISCX botnet test
dataset. We have implemented the proposed SOM Algorithm 1, same as before. From
Figure 4.4 the numbers in each cell represent the total number of nodes that belong to the
corresponding cluster. These nodes share similar behaviors in terms of the identified
graph-based features. For example, there exist 26,652 nodes in the biggest cluster (in
blue), which accounts for over 93% of nodes (Table 4.7) in ISCX botnet test dataset.
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Figure 4.4

SOM on ISCX botnet test dataset

From Table 4.7 number of bots identified in each cluster shows the malicious
nodes of ISCX dataset have been scattered into the smallest clusters. As we discussed
before abnormal/malicious behaviors are rare in most of real-world networks and the
biggest cluster (with maximum number of nodes) are unlikely to be bots. In further
inspection, the nodes in the biggest cluster can be eliminated to reduce the computational
costs in further investigation of bots. From Table 4.8 the percentage of nodes to be
eliminated is more than 93%. Comparing with the results of CTU-13 dataset, it is true
that similar observations are drawn when the proposed methodology has been
implemented on ISCX Botnet test dataset. It again proves the robustness of the proposed
methodology and also we expect the method of detecting bot in the rest of the small
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clusters by eliminating the biggest cluster will hold true for any other new datasets but we
cannot guarantee it.
Table 4.7

Number of nodes in each cluster of ISCX Botnet test dataset after
implementing proposed methodology
Cluster number

Number of nodes in
each cluster

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
3
4
4
5
5
8
9
12
14
15
19
27
35
42
43
50
61
96
112
167
266
312
594
26652
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Number of bots
identified in each
cluster
0
0
2
0
2
1
0
0
0
2
1
2
1
1
5
1
0
3
4
3
1
2
0
3
0

Table 4.8

Create a short, concise table title and place all detailed caption, notes,
reference, legend information, etc in the notes section below

Dataset

Number of
Bots

Total number of
nodes

Number of nodes in
the biggest cluster

% of nodes to
eliminated

ISCX Botnet
Test

35

28556

26652

93.3324

4.4

Benchmark Against Classification Techniques
We compare our proposed clustering approach with some of the available

classification techniques to detect bots.
4.4.1

Support Vector Machine Classifier
Support vector machine (SVM) is a powerful supervised machine learning

technique [54], which is used for classification and regression analysis. It is introduced by
Cortes and Vapnik [53]. Basically, SVM classifies the data into two classes by generating
an optimal hyper-plane, which has the largest distance to the nearest training samples. To
predict the class of new observations, the SVM learning algorithm, splits data to training
and validation set. The decision boundary (i.e., a hyper-plane) is determined using training
set. Subsequently, SVM classifier predicts class of the observations for validation set based
on the distance of each observation from decision boundary. Optimal hyperplane dividing
the data in to two classes can be written as set of point 𝑥⃗ satisfying 𝑤
⃗⃗⃗⃗⃗. 𝑥⃗ + b = 0 , where
𝑤
⃗⃗⃗ is the normal vector of the hyperplane [55]. The parameter b gives the offset distance
from the origin. The parallel marginal hyperplanes can be given by the equations,
𝑤
⃗⃗⃗. 𝑥⃗ + b = 1

(4.1)

𝑤
⃗⃗⃗. 𝑥⃗ + b = -1

(4.2)
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Two parallel marginal hyperplanes are generated on both the sides of the optimal
hyperplane that separates the data. The sample points which are used to generate the
optimal hyper-plane are called the support vectors (SVs). The distance between the two
2

marginal hyperplanes with the largest margin is given by 𝑀 = ⃓⃓ 𝑤⃓⃓

Figure 4.5

Shows the linear separating hyperplane for the separable case, and the solid
circle and squares on the margin are called support vectors.

If the dataset is not linearly separable, one can use more general kernel functions
that provides non-linear decision boundaries by generating a hyperplane in a multidimensional feature space. The kernel function(ϕ) plays a critical role in the SVM
training and classification. Some commonly implemented kernel functions [9056] are the
Gaussian radial basis function (RBF) kernel, Polynomial kernel and the Sigmoid kernel.
The advantage of SVM is that it works well with small training datasets.
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4.4.2

K-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) Classifier
K-NN is one of the widely-used machine learning algorithms, which is an

extension of the nearest neighbor (NN) classifier [9157]. K-NN classifies an object by
choosing the majority vote of its nearest neighbors. Here, the object will be designated to
a class based on the most frequent class of its K nearest neighbors, where K is a user
defined constant. In a multidimensional feature space, all the training sample are vectors
assigned with a class label. During the training phase, the classifier remembers the class
labels and feature values of the training samples. For instance, assume that x_0 is a test
point (an unlabeled vector) which is needed to be classified in a testing phase. When a Knearest neighbor query starts, it grows like a spherical region until the query is enclosed
by K training samples. When the classifier finds the set of desired K nearest neighbors in
the training set to x_0, it classifies the test point as the most frequent class among the K
neighbors closer to it.
Considering the outcome of K-NN on 1 nearest neighbor as shown in the example
Figure 4.6 the prediction of K-NN of the test sample (orange circle) will be ‘+’ as it is
closer to it. If K = 2, K-NN will be not able to classify the test sample outcome since the
second closest sample is ‘-‘, both the minus and plus signs receive the same score. If K is
3 then the outcome is ‘-‘, and if K is 5 then it is ‘+’ as the respective signs dominate the
nearest neighbors in each case. In our case the k value is 5 and Euclidian distance method
is used to compute the nearest distance between the test sample and training sample.
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Figure 4.6

4.4.3

K-NN classification approach

Decision Tree classifier (DT)
Decision Tree is a well-known supervised machine learning technique that is used

for classification and regression analysis. The basic idea of DT is to predict the class of a
variable based on the training model by learning decision rules. The algorithm of DT is
very simple and it can be represented by a tree structure. Initially while training, the
algorithm tries to split the root node into subsets based on the decision value and it goes
till the leaf node is found. Hence, whenever there is a new set of data point to predict, DT
simply compares the new data point with the trained model and determines which class it
belongs to. For instance, form the Figure 4.7, if there is a new data Z and needs to be
defined weather Bot or None-Bot, then first the algorithm tries to use the attributes value
of the test data and compare with the training set. Assume if the value of the attribute x_2
is < -0.55 then it picks the left branch and goes to next subset and again if the value of
attribute x_1<1.5 then it predicts the class of Z as a Bot else Non- Bot.
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Figure 4.7

4.5

Example of Decision Tree Classification

Classification Results
The programs of all the three classifiers is available in MATLAB packages. We

train the SVM, K-NN and DT classifiers using ISCX botnet test dataset and use CTU-13
datasets for testing the classifiers. Training the classifiers in one of the important step
while implementing classification techniques. As ISCX dataset is a combination of three
different subset datasets which includes CTU data we choose this as a training dataset.
During the training phase the classifier learn and frame guidelines in differentiating bot
and non-bot based on the feature values provided.
The classification techniques cannot provide efficient result in accurately
classifying the CTU-13 datasets to Bot and Non-Bot classes, since there is high variation
in feature values. Specifically, due to the complex behaviors of bots, classification
becomes challenging as characteristics of training and testing data can significantly vary.
The percentage of misclassification by using three classifiers are presented in Table 4.9.
The three classifiers are only capable of determining just 10% of accurate classification
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for the 10th and 11th datasets only. However, for the rest of the scenarios,
misclassification rates are 100%.
Table 4.9

Classification result.

Implemented on
CTU 13 Dataset

% of Misclassification and comparison between classifiers
trained with ISCX Botnet dataset
SVM

DT

KNN

1

100

100

100

2

100

100

100

3

100

100

100

4

100

100

100

5

100

100

100

6

100

100

100

7

100

100

100

8

100

100

100

9

100

100

100

10

90

90

90

11

90

90

90

12

100

100

100

13

100

100

100
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
In this work, we propose a graph-based botnet detection approach that can detect
changing behaviors of bots. This is novel because the existing approaches mainly rely on
flow-based features and thus do not capture the changes in the topological structure of
networks caused by bot activities. We investigate seven graphed-based features that are
may be connected to bot activities: in degree, out degree, in degree weight, out degree
weight, clustering coefficient, node betweenness, and eigenvector centrality. SOM is
applied to establish the clusters of nodes based on these graphed features. Our approach
is capable of isolating bots in clusters with very small sizes (less than 100 nodes), which
enables fast detection of bot nodes. The proposed algorithm is further enhanced by
filtering out inactive nodes, which are unlikely to be bots. We verify the proposed
methods using CTU-13 and ISCX Botnet dataset. Numerical results show that our
proposed procedure is capable of detecting the bots by searching limited number of
nodes.
We compare our approach with three different classification algorithms using the
same graph-based features. All the methods are not capable of detecting most of the bots
because of the varying values of bot features across different datasets (Bot features vary
from one dataset to another). The advantage of our approach is that we focusing on
capturing the abnormal behaviors of bots in terms of their graph-based behaviors. In other
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words, our method is more robust against the changing behaviors of bots because the
proposed approach does not rely on any particular value/range of features. With different
types of bot behavior, the proposed method can still detect bot with reasonable accuracy.
What this approach ensures is that, bots will always be found in small sized clusters with
the majority of nodes (>99%) removed from further consideration. Our study shows that,
as long as the bots behave differently from normal nodes, such different behaviors can be
captured by our clustering-based detection algorithm and further testing is needed in
determining the bots from the smallest clusters. Future work is needed to incorporate
additional graph-based features and reduce the computational costs of graph feature
extraction and testing on other datasets. Note that, as feature extraction cost contributes to
the overall computational cost, future work is needed to investigate how feature
extraction cost can be minimized. Effect of incorporating more relevant graph-based
features into the detection methodology is also a future research direction.
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